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Showing posts with label Baldwin IV of Jerusalem. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Baldwin IV of Jerusalem. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 23, 2018
Saturday, October 21, 2017
5 Epic Battles of the Knights Templar
Today on Real Crusades History, we’ll be exploring five
of the most epic and noteworthy battles in the history of the Knights Templar.
#1: The
Battle of Montgisard
In late November, 1177, a large Crusader army had
accompanied Count Philip of Flanders on an expedition north of the Kingdom of
Jerusalem, into Syria, to attack the Saracen fortress of Hama. Saladin, the
powerful Sultan of Egypt and Damascus, took advantage of the Crusader kingdom’s
reduced forces to invade with a large army some 26,000 strong. The King of
Jerusalem, Baldwin IV, was only sixteen years old, and also stricken with
leprosy. Nevertheless, the young King would not let Saladin’s attack go unchallenged,
mustering a small army of just five hundred knights and four thousand infantry.
The young leper King was joined by Raynald of Chatillon, as well as Odo of
Saint-Amand, Master of the Knights Templar, accompanied by some eighty Templar
knights.
Saladin did not believe such a tiny
force of Christians should be considered a threat, and so marched at his
leisure on Jerusalem, allowing his army to spread out across the countryside
and pillage the Kingdom’s farmlands. Meanwhile, King Baldwin, the Templars, and
the knights of the Kingdom closed in on Saladin’s army, encountering the enemy
at Montgisard, near the city of Ramla.
Saladin was taken by surprise; his forces were in a
vulnerable position attempting to cross a river. The young King immediately
ordered a charge, and the Templars were at the forefront of the attack. Odo of
Saint Amand led the Templars in several charges, which smashed Saladin’s forces.
The Templars’ skills as cavalry warriors proved highly valuable that day, as
almost the whole of Saladin’s army was wiped out. Saladin himself barely escaped,
having to flee for his life on a racing camel.
Montgisard proved to be one of the greatest defeats of
Saladin’s life, and a shining moment for King Baldwin IV, the knights of
Jerusalem, and the Templars.
#2: The
Battle of Hattin
On June 30, 1187, Saladin once again invaded the Kingdom
of Jerusalem; his army was massive, numbering 30,000 men. To incite the
Crusaders into a battle, Saladin attacked Tiberias.
The King of Jerusalem, Guy of
Lusignan, marched out with a smaller but considerable army of 20,000, including
a large contingent of Knights Templar. Although the other high ranking men of
the army advised against it, Guy listened to the advice of the Master of the
Temple, Gerard of Ridefort, who suggested an immediate attack on Saladin. The
Crusaders made a forced march across scorching dry territory toward Tiberias.
But when they tried to reach the Springs of Kafr Hattin, Saladin’s army
intercepted them, forcing them to lay camp on the arid plateau. By morning the
Crusaders were entirely surrounded by Saladin’s army, and Saladin launched his
attack. The Crusaders suffered heavy casualties from Saladin’s archers and
cavalry. But despite being outnumbered, exhausted and thirsty, the Crusaders
fought with incredible vigor, and several times the Christian knights threw
back Saladin’s attacks. The Templars were instrumental in this resistance, and
fought with fierce spirit and courage. Indeed, the Saracen chronicler Ibn
al-Athir tells us that Saladin, watching the battle unfold before him, was very
nervous, tugging at his beard with anxiety as he watched the Templars and the
other Crusaders repeatedly hurl the Saracen troops back.
Nevertheless, the superior numbers
of Saladin’s forces finally prevailed and the Crusaders were defeated. It was a
devastating loss for the Kingdom. Saladin was so afraid of the Knights Templar
that he had every Templar prisoner captured at the Battle of Hattin executed
immediately.
Despite their defeat at Hattin, the
Templars once again showed themselves to be brilliant warriors, who fought with
fierce determination even in the most desperate of situations.
For our next battle, we’ll move to
the Iberian Peninsula, specifically Portugal:
#3: The
Siege of Tomar
The castle of Tomar, built in 1160, was the headquarters
of the Knights Templar in Portugal for many years. In the late twelfth century,
a powerful Moroccan Berber dynasty, the Almohads, ruled over much of North
Africa. They also controlled most of those portions of southern Spain still
under Mohammedan rule.
In 1190, the Almohad Caliph,
al-Mansur, crossed the River Tejo and invaded the Kingdom of Portugal. The
Almohads captured the castle of Torres Novas, then moved on Tomar, which they
put to siege.
Gualdim Pais, Grand Master, led the
Templar garrison in defense of their fortress. Despite being impossibly outnumbered,
the Templars held out for six days. Gualdim was around seventy years old at the
time, and a long-time veteran of the Crusades both in Iberia and in the Holy
Land. The Almohads made several assaults on the walls, but each time they were
repulsed by the Templars. Finally, the Almohads managed to breach the fortress
gates, but Gualdim led his knights in a counterattack, which devastated the
Almohad troops. So heavy were the Almohad casualties during this attack that
from then on the entrance to Tomar was known as “The Gate of Blood”.
At this point al-Mansur gave up his
attack, withdrawing his troops and abandoning the siege. Tomar remained in
Christian hands. The valor and determination of Gualdim Pais and his Templars
had won the day.
For our next battle, let’s return to
the Crusades in the Holy Land:
#4: The
Battle of Arsuf
Following Saladin’s victory at Hattin, Richard the
Lionheart, King of England, led a Crusade to the Holy Land to beat back the
Saracen advance. After recapturing the wealthy coastal city of Acre from
Saladin in the summer of 1191, Richard marched his forces south down the
Palestinian coast, placing the Knights Templar at the head of the army.
Saladin was desperate to stop
Richard’s advance, and so, as Richard’s army approached Arsuf on September 7th,
Saladin attacked with full force. Once again, the Crusaders, with an army of
under 12,000 troops, were outnumbered; Saladin had a host of 25,000. Nevertheless,
Richard’s formation was solid and impenetrable. The Knights Hospitaller, who
made up the rearguard, charged early, but Richard took advantage of the
situation, and ordered a general charge, which crushed Saladin’s troops. The
Templars, under their new Grand Master, Robert de Sable, played a key role in
the battle, delivering some of the most devastating charges. Saladin was
utterly defeated, losing thousands of troops. Richard and the Crusaders won the
day, occupying Arsuf, and going on to take the important coastal city of Jaffa
as well.
Once again, Templar cavalry tactics had proved very
useful in the heat of battle.
For our last battle, we’ll again
head to Spain:
#5: The
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa
In the summer of 1212, the Almohad Caliph, Muhammad
al-Nasir, gathered an enormous army of some 25,000 troops and marched north out
of Seville, intent on invading the Christian Kingdom of Castile with its
capital in Toledo. Meanwhile, Pope Innocent III had proclaimed a Crusade in
Spain to counter al-Nasir. Christian knights from virtually every corner of the
Iberian Peninsula gathered in Toledo under King Alfonso VIII of Castile, King
Pedro II of Aragon, and King Sancho VII of Navarre. Included in this Crusader
coalition was a considerable contingent of Knights Templar under their Grand
Master, Gomes Ramires, who was Portuguese.
The Crusaders marched south and the
two armies met on July 14th at Las Navas de Tolosa. On the morning
of July 16th, the battle began. The Templars and other military
orders were in the front lines, and closed quickly with the Almohad troops. The
fighting was fierce, and the Templars suffered some of the heaviest casualties
on the Christian side. However, the Aragonese and Navaresse contingents, which
made up the Christian right and left flanks, carried out a pincer movement that
threw the Moors into disarray. A series of cavalry charges now shattered the
Almohad army, and the Christian victory was total. Thousands of Almohad troops
were slain, and the Caliph himself barely escaped with his life. The Templar
Grand Master, Gomes Ramires, was one of the few Christina casualties, since he
and his brother Templars had been among the first warriors to ride into battle;
they died helping to win an incredible victory for the Iberian Crusade, which
led to the collapse of Moorish power in Spain.
Thursday, September 7, 2017
The Crusades
A pictorial journey through some riveting moments in the history of the Crusades, set to the song "Agnes" by J Stephen Roberts
Friday, November 25, 2016
Battle of Montgisard, November 25, 1177
On November 25, 1177 a Frankish army under the command of a 16-year-old leper routed the army of the mighty Sultan of Cairo and Damascus, Salah al-Din. It was a surprise victory to say the least, and won by a mere fragment of the Frankish chivalry (because a large portion of the knights of the kingdom were campaigning in the north) and the hastily summoned, amateur infantry of the arrière ban.
In 1177, Salah-al-Din (known in the West as Saladin) launched a full-scale invasion of the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem. It was less than ten years since Saladin had assassinated his way to power in the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo, and only three years since the coup d’etat in Damascus by which he had established himself in the heart of Syria. Although he had yet to take the key cities of Aleppo and Mosul (both of which remained loyal to the son of Nur ad-Din), Saladin had, for the most part, united the Caliphates of Cairo and Baghdad for the first time in 200 years. However, his hold on power was precarious. In Egypt he faced suspicion and opposition because he was Sunni, and in Syria he was viewed as a usurper and upstart because he was a Kurd and had stolen the Sultanate from the rightful heir.
A Contemporary Depiction of Salah-ad-Din from an Islamic Manuscript
Saladin countered these internal doubts and dissatisfaction with his rule with the age-old device of focusing attention on an external enemy: the Christian states established by the crusaders along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. These states represented not merely a military threat to his lines of communication between Egypt and Syria, but had also five times in the 1160s invaded Egypt. The Frankish campaigns in Egypt were not all been wars of aggression, as in three of them the Shia Viziers had requested Christian help against their Sunni enemies. Nevertheless, the fact remained that army of Jerusalem, often aided by Byzantine fleets, had conducted repeated campaigns on Egyptian territory and once come close to capturing Cairo.
Saladin did not simply beat the drum of alarm concerning an external enemy in order to rally his subjects around him; he took up the cry of “jihad” — Holy War. This was a clear attempt to increase his stature vis-a-vis his remaining rivals in Syria. Salah al-Din means “righteousness of the faith,” and Salah al-Din throughout his career used campaigns against the Christian states as a means of rallying support.
Another depiction of Saladin; Source Unknown
Saladin had not invented jihad. The word itself appears multiple times in the Koran, but with varying meanings. It was also used as justification for the Muslim conquests of the 7th Century. It had, however, become less popular in later centuries until Nur ad-Din, the Seljuk ruler of Syria from 1146-1174, reinvigorated the concept. Most historians agree, however, that Nur ad-Din used jihad when it suited him, but remained a fundamentally secular ruler. He had, however, unleashed the jinni from the bottle and the concept of “Holy War” soon gained increasing support in the madrassas and mosques across the Seljuk territories of the Near East. By the time Saladin came to power there was a body of already radicalized youth eager to follow the call to jihad.
Meanwhile, in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, King Amalaric, who had been so intent on conquering parts if not all of Egypt, had died. He had been succeeded by Baldwin IV, a youth suffering from leprosy. Conscious of his own weakness and imminent death, Baldwin IV sent to the West for aid, and in early August 1177, Count Philip of Flanders reached Acre with a large force of Western knights.
On the advice of the High Court, Baldwin IV offered Philip of Flanders the regency of his kingdom, whose armies were preparing yet another invasion of Egypt aided by a large Byzantine fleet. Flanders, however, insisted on being made king of any territories the joint Christian forces conquered. The idea did not sit well with either the King of Jerusalem or the Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire, both of whom were footing the bill and providing the bulk of the troops for the expedition. The result was that the entire expedition was called off, the Byzantine fleet withdrew and Philip of Flanders took his knights and half the barons of Jerusalem north to attack the Seljuk strongholds of Hama and Harim instead.
A Medieval depiction of a Crusading Host
Salah ad-Din had gathered his forces in Egypt to repel the impending attack. He rapidly learned that not only had the invasion of Egypt been called off and the Byzantine fleet had withdrawn, but that the bulk of the fighting forces of Jerusalem had moved north. It was a splendid opportunity to strike, and the Sultan seized the opportunity with a force estimated at 26,000 light horse — which leaves open the question of whether infantry was with him or not. The force also allegedly included some 1,000 mamluks of the Sultan’s personal bodyguard.
According to an anonymous Christian chronicler from northern Syria, the news of Saladin’s invasion plunged Jerusalem into despair. The king was just 16 years old, had no battle experience of his own, and his most experienced commanders (or many of them) were besieging Hama. The Constable of the Kingdom, the competent and wise Humphrey de Toron II, was gravely ill. But according to Archbishop William of Tyre, Baldwin’s former tutor now his chancellor and our best contemporary source, Baldwin rallied his forces and with just 376 knights made a dash to Ascalon, the southern-most stronghold of his kingdom.
Arriving there only shortly before Saladin himself on November 22, King Baldwin took control of the city, but then hesitated to risk open battle with the Saracens because of the imbalance of forces. Thus, while King Baldwin's dash to Ascalon had been heroic, it had been less than wise strategically. Salah ad-Din had effectively trapped the King and his knights inside Ascalon, and nothing lay between Saladin and Jerusalem except scattered garrisons. Rather than wasting time besieging a fortified city with a strong defending force, Saladin left a enough of his army behind to maintain the siege of Ascalon and moved off with the bulk of his troops.
But this was where Salah al-Din miscalculated. The Sultan and his emirs were so confident of victory that they took time to plunder the rich cities of the coastal plain, notably Ramla and Lydda, but also as far inland as Hebron. In Jerusalem, the terrified population sought refuge in the Citadel of David.
The Citadel of David as it appears today. |
But Baldwin IV was not yet defeated. With the number of Saracen troops surrounding Ascalon dramatically reduced, he risked a sortie. He also got word to the Templars in the fortress of Gaza, and they sortied out to rendezvous with the King. Together this mounted force started to shadow Saladin’s now dispersed and no longer disciplined army. Frankish tactics, however, required a combination of cavalry and infantry, so King Baldwin could not engage the enemy until he had infantry as well. He therefore issued the arrière ban, a general call to arms that obligated every Christian to rally to the royal standard in defense of the realm. The burgesses started streaming to join him.
What happened next is usually depicted as a "miracle" or just "dumb luck." On the other hand, a number of modern historians, basing their assessment on Arab sources, claim that the real commander at Montgisard was Reynald de Chatillon, the Lord of Transjordan, but this is a red herring. Arab sources had absolutely no insight into the Frankish command structure. The most prominent fighter on the battlefield is not necessarily (indeed rarely) the actual commander. Furthermore, because Chatillon was a familiar figure to the Arabs, so he was recognized. Most important, Arab chroniclers were at pains to justify Saladin's summary execution of Chatillon ten years later after the Battle of Hattin by making Chatillon into a particularly dangerous enemy of Islam. Making him the mastermind of Montgisard fit this agenda, but it proves nothing about who actually devised the strategy and led the Frankish army to victory at Montgisard.
Michael Erhlich in a reassessment of the Battle of Montgisard published in Medieval Military History [Vol. XI, 2013, pp. 95-105] argues convincingly that the Franks lured Saladin into marshy ground, where his superiority of numbers could not come into play. He notes further that the effective use of terrain had to be based on intimate local knowledge of the countryside -- something Chatillon had no more than Saladin. Chatillon was a Frenchman, who had been prince of Antioch, then in Saracen captivity for 15 years, before becoming the Lord of Transjordan; he had no particular familiarity with the coastal plain.
Ehrlich contends
compellingly that the kind of familiarity with the terrain necessary for springing
the trap on Saladin came from “a local lord.” Not only does this make sense,
but it was the custom of Frankish armies to give command of the vanguard of the
army to the lord in whose territory an engagement occurred — and that was
Baldwin d’Ibelin, Lord of Ramla. Indeed, the battle took place so close to
Ramla that it is called the “Battle of Ramla” in the Arab sources.
What happened next is usually depicted as a "miracle" or just "dumb luck." On the other hand, a number of modern historians, basing their assessment on Arab sources, claim that the real commander at Montgisard was Reynald de Chatillon, the Lord of Transjordan, but this is a red herring. Arab sources had absolutely no insight into the Frankish command structure. The most prominent fighter on the battlefield is not necessarily (indeed rarely) the actual commander. Furthermore, because Chatillon was a familiar figure to the Arabs, so he was recognized. Most important, Arab chroniclers were at pains to justify Saladin's summary execution of Chatillon ten years later after the Battle of Hattin by making Chatillon into a particularly dangerous enemy of Islam. Making him the mastermind of Montgisard fit this agenda, but it proves nothing about who actually devised the strategy and led the Frankish army to victory at Montgisard.
Michael Erhlich in a reassessment of the Battle of Montgisard published in Medieval Military History [Vol. XI, 2013, pp. 95-105] argues convincingly that the Franks lured Saladin into marshy ground, where his superiority of numbers could not come into play. He notes further that the effective use of terrain had to be based on intimate local knowledge of the countryside -- something Chatillon had no more than Saladin. Chatillon was a Frenchman, who had been prince of Antioch, then in Saracen captivity for 15 years, before becoming the Lord of Transjordan; he had no particular familiarity with the coastal plain.
On the afternoon of November 25, King Baldwin’s host of about 450 knights (375 secular knights and 84 Templars from Gaza), with their squires, turcopoles and infantry in unspecified numbers lured Saladin's army into following them off the main road to Jerusalem and then, in territory where Saladin could not bring his numbers to bear, Baldwin's army struck. The Sultan, as he later admitted to Saracen chroniclers, was caught off-guard. Before he could properly deploy his troops, the Frankish army had over-run much of his army.
A modern portrayal of the Battle of Montgisard by Mariusz Kozik
Although the battle was hard-fought and there were Christian casualties, the Sultan’s forces were routed. Not only that, Salah ad-Din himself came very close to being killed or captured and allegedly escaped on the back of a pack-camel. Yet for the bulk of his army there was no escape. Those who were not slaughtered immediately on the field, found themselves scattered and virtually defenseless in enemy territory. Although they abandoned their plunder, it was still a long way home — and the rains had set in. Cold, wet, slowed down by the mud, no longer benefiting from the strength of numbers, they were easy prey for the residents and settlers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The latter, after the sack of Lydda, Ramla and other lesser places, had good reason to crave revenge. Furthermore, even after escaping Christian territory, the Sultan’s troops still found no refuge because once in the desert the Bedouins took advantage of the situation to enslave as many men as they could catch in order to enrich themselves. Very few men of the Sultan’s army made it home to safety in Egypt.
Saladin was badly shaken by this defeat. He had good reason to believe it would discredit him and initially feared it would trigger revolts against his rule. Later, he convinced himself that God had spared him for a purpose. Certainly, he was to learn from his defeat. He never again allowed himself to be duped by his own over-confidence and his subsequent campaigns against the crusader states were marked by greater caution. It was not until the crushing defeat of the Frankish armies at Hattin in July 1187 — almost ten years later — that he had his revenge.
Labels:
Baldwin IV of Jerusalem,
Montgisard,
Saladin
Friday, February 5, 2016
Real Crusades History Book Review: Knight of Jerusalem and Defender of Jerusalem
Even
the most casual students of medieval history, readers of historical fiction,
moviegoers, and the public have long been familiar with the heroic King Richard
I ‘The Lionhearted’ of England, and Salah ad-Din, Sultan of Egypt and Richard’s
chivalrous nemesis as commander of Islamic forces over the course of the Third
Crusade, the most enduringly famous of these fiercely fought holy wars that
began over nine hundred years ago. Indeed, until the 2005 release of the at-best
questionable Hollywood epic Kingdom of
Heaven, other persons and events of great importance in the years preceding
and during the Third Crusade remained the province of medieval scholars, their
students, and those with sufficient interest to explore beyond the
superficialities of cinema and, often as not, poorly researched novels.
With
Knight of Jerusalem and its sequel, Defender of Jerusalem, Dr. Helena
Schrader has brought academic rigor, her extensive knowledge of the Middle Ages
and the Crusades, and her previous experience as an author of historical
fiction to bear in recreating the lives and deeds of Baldwin IV, the ‘Leper
King’, and his loyal vassal Balian of Ibelin, two great heroes of the Holy Land
Crusades brought to long-overdue recognition by way of the well-played yet sadly
inaccurate portrayals in Kingdom of
Heaven.
Little
is to be gained by summarizing Knight of
Jerusalem and Defender of Jerusalem for
this review; a brief biography of Balian should suffice to introduce readers to
the principal
character of both volumes. Born in 1143, Balian was the third son of Barisan, lord
of the baronies of Ibelin and Ramla in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In 1169, Balian
was granted lordship of Ibelin by his older brother Baldwin, giving
the initially landless young knight an entreé into the higher aristocracy of
Outremer. Balian had a significant role in leadership of the forces of the
‘Leper King’ Baldwin IV to victory over Salah ad-Din at the Battle of Montgisard
in 1177, and in the same year, entered into marriage with Maria Comnena, grandniece
of Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Comnenus and dowered widow of King Almaric I of
Jerusalem. These fortuitous events, and the gain of the Barony of Nablus by his
marriage, made Balian a powerful figure in the Crusader States.
Balian’s
reputation was further enhanced by his unwavering support for the dying Baldwin
IV and his opposition to the elevation of the incompetent Guy of Lusignan to
the throne of Jerusalem. Most important was his survival, free and unharmed, after
the disastrous Battle of Hattin in July 1187, which made possible his heroic
role in commanding the defense of Jerusalem against the forces of Salah el-Din
in September and October of the same year, and his hard promises that gained merciful
terms of surrender from the Sultan when the fall of the city became inevitable.
Dr.
Schrader brilliantly synthesizes the roles of academician and master
storyteller. In contrast with Kingdom
director Ridley Scott’s careless plot construction and deliberate distortions,
Dr. Schrader has meticulously constructed an accurate geographical, environmental,
political, and familial landscape using the proven historical record, as well
as created finely drawn lead characters from the relatively scant existing information
on the life of Balian, the more extensive records of Baldwin, and the numerous
but oft-conflicting accounts of Salah ad-Din. The many supporting and minor
characters, from the beautiful and wealthy Maria Comnena to the humblest
servant, are brought to life with equal assurance.
Though
‘Knight’ and ‘Defender’ are exhilarating page-turners from first page to last,
these very qualities of intricate construction make careful reading an agreeable
necessity. The essentials of successful medieval novels are firmly in place: abundantly
vivid and violent battle scenes; romantic situations entrancing for the modern
reader as well as true to the times; and a sense of time and place convincingly
evocative of the Middle Ages. But, beyond the pure pleasure of reading, ‘Knight’ and ‘Defender’ represent a
growing and significant trend: the entry of talented academic historians who
can write a rip-roaring story into the field of historical fiction; a trend
which can only raise the bars of careful research and historical accuracy for
all HF writers.
Needless
to say, I eagerly await the third volume of Dr. Schrader’s Jerusalem trilogy; for ‘Knight’
and ‘Defender’, five stars and the highest recommendation! ~ Scott Amis
Saturday, January 30, 2016
Agnes de Courtenay
Though armies were led and battles fought by men, the history of the Crusades is replete with powerful and influential women. In this biography, Dr. Helena Schrader recounts the life of such a woman: Agnes de Courtenay, spurned Queen of Jerusalem and mother of 'Leper King' Baldwin IV.
Cast of Characters 3: The Queen Mother
Cast of Characters 3: The Queen Mother
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