The Emperor's deputy in Outremer had now decisively defeated the Ibelin/Cypriot army at the Battle of Casal Imbert and occupied Cyprus without a fight. Henry I may have come of age, but he was a king without a kingdom. He appeared on the brink of becoming an obscure footnote in history. Instead, he recovered his kingdom in less than two months and ruled for another two decades. Indeed, he delivered such a resounding blow to the forces of the Holy Roman Emperor that he was able to shake off the Imperial yoke altogether.
In
the surprise attack at Casal Imbert, the Cypriot/Ibelin army had lost
roughly 30 knights and the bulk of their horses and equipment. More
important, the Genoese had lost their ships. Thus, while Filangieri
struck in Cyprus, King Henry had no means of responding. Filangieri had
brilliantly taken advantage of his enemy’s concentration of forces in
one place, to attack in another.
Yet
Filangieri had underestimated the Cypriot King. Henry had come of age
on the same day that he had to flee from Casal Imbert in his nightshirt.
He now proved that he had been no puppet of the Ibelins. Had he been
merely their prisoner up to now, he would have abandoned their cause and
turned to Filangieri to help him crush his former jailers. Instead, he
used his increased stature as king to make significant concessions to
the Genoese, securing their continued support, and in order to obtain
revenue and fighting men through the bestowal of fiefs in Cyprus upon
Syrian knights. In just one month, the Cypriot/Ibelin army was
sufficiently reequipped to return to Cyprus — in Imperial ships.
The
latter had been tied up in Acre idle. Henry and the Lord of Beirut
appealed to the anti-Imperial Patriarch of Jerusalem, arguing that
Filangieri in occupying Cyprus had committed a grave sin that threatened
the safety of the Holy Land. The point was that Filangieri had attacked
a Christian monarch without justification. While the Patriarch
sympathized, he demurred, saying he could not interfere in secular
affairs. However, he also noted that he would not stop anyone from
seizing the ships. At once, the pro-Ibelin mob rushed down to the
harbour, where they managed to seize 13 of the large Imperial
"salanders" (apparently warships), while the remaining Imperial ships
managed to escape by slipping anchor and sailing away.
In
these "confiscated" ships, the Cypriot/Ibelin knights, turcopoles and
sergeants sailed for Cyprus at the very end of May or the first days of
June. Expecting the ports to be heavily defended, Beirut took the
radical decision to beach (i.e. wreck) their confiscated Imperial
galleys on the shore of an island near Famagusta. This island was
connected to the mainland only at low tide. From here, some of the men
took small boats into Famagusta harbor to make noise and create a
diversion, while the bulk of the army crossed via the ford to the
mainland at dawn without encountering serious opposition.
Indeed,
by daybreak, it was clear that the Imperial forces, possibly
overestimating the strength of the Cypriot/Ibelin force in the darkness,
had opted for a strategic withdrawal. King Henry and his troops spent
three days in Famagusta receiving the surrender of the key castle of
Kantara and collecting further support before advancing cautiously
toward Nicosia. Although they encountered no resistance, they found that
the retreating Imperial troops had burned the granges and also
vandalized the water and windmills.
On
arrival in Nicosia, the Cypriot/Ibelin army found that, again, the
enemy had retreated before them. With a sense of relief, they sought
food and lodging — only to be called to arms at vespers. The men rushed
out, mustered and marched north to face an Imperial attack. When they
were beyond the walls, however, they discovered that the alarm had been
rung by Beirut himself. Recognizing that they still faced an intact and
formidable enemy army that might strike at any time, Beirut wanted no repeat of Casal Imbert. He ordered the collected and alerted army to camp in a defensible position near water and gardens and a watch was established.
The
next morning, the army set out along the main road from Nicosia to
Kyrenia. Between these two cities a dramatic mountain range with jagged
peaks and deep pine forests rises up. From Nicosia, the road runs almost
due north, weaving with the terrain, until it turns sharply to the
right to enter a pass that runs west-east. Then having crested the pass,
the road turns north again to descend toward the coastal plain and the
port of Kyrenia. Just before the end of the pass, the main road to the
royal castle of St. Hilarion branches off.
St.
Hilarion still held for King Henry and was filled with many women and
children of Ibelin supporters as well as King Henry’s two sisters. King
Henry had received word that the castle was dangerously short of
supplies and would soon have to capitulate if it did not receive aid.
Anticipating an attempt to relieve St. Hilarion, Filangieri positioned
the main body of his army inside the pass, where it was invisible from
the lower part of the road, but he had deployed two advance divisions
across the Nicosia-Kyrenia road just below the entrance to the pass.
 |
| The mountains separating Kyrenia from Nicosia, seen from the north looking west. |
The
Imperial forces on Cyprus consisted of the Cypriot traitors and the
bulk of the Sicilian knights and Imperial mercenaries. Altogether,
Filangieri could deploy over 2,000 horsemen and an unknown number of
archers and infantry. The Cypriot/Ibelin army, on the other hand, had
been decimated by the desertions, the reinforcement of Beirut, and the
losses of Casal Imbert. King Henry could field only 236 knights,
supported by sergeants and turcopoles of unrecorded number. The
advancing Cypriot/Ibelin army was not only much smaller, it was below
the Imperial army and would have to fight uphill to breakthrough.
However,
King Henry knew of a steep and narrow path that ascended the mountain
from a village called Agridi just less than a mile west of the main
road, i.e., before the enemy positions. Beirut proposed advancing
to Agridi, and under cover of darkness the next night, sending relief
to St. Hilarion over the narrow path. Beirut divided his army into four
divisions, commanded as follows: 1) Sir Hugh d’Ibelin (Beirut’s third
son) and Sir Anseau de Brie, 2) Sir Baldwin d’Ibelin (Beirut’s second
son, 3) the Lord of Caesarea (Beirut’s nephew) and 4) Beirut with King
Henry.
Beirut’s
eldest son Balian, who already had a reputation for prowess from
earlier engagements, was publicly denied the place of honor in command
of the vanguard, because he had been excommunicated for failing to set
aside his wife — and cousin — Eschiva de Montbéliard. (That same lady
who had provisioned and was holding the only other castle that had
remained loyal to the king as described last week) Saying he trusted God
more than Sir Balian’s knighthood, Beirut ordered his firstborn and
heir to the rear.
Daylight,
however, revealed the pathetic size of the Cypriot/Ibelin army.
Immediately, the Sicilians took heart and with cheers, the first
division started to descend the slope to attack. Led by Count Walter of
Manupello, this division only glancingly engaged with Beirut’s rearguard
before continuing toward Nicosia. Christopher Marshall in Warfare in the Latin East suggests
this was a matter of incompetence; that the charge was carried out so
badly that momentum swept it past the enemy doing no damage. It is
equally possible, however, that the intention was to either divert some
of Beirut’s troops and divide his forces or to reestablish Imperial
control of Nicosia and cut Beirut and King Henry off from retreat. We
know some of Beirut’s knights wanted to pursue and Beirut had to prevent
them. Certainly, it was only after the Cypriot/Ibelin force carried the
day that Count of Manupello retreated to Gastria to seek refuge with
the Templars.
Meanwhile,
however, the second Imperial division had fallen on the first division
of the Cypriot/Ibelin army and pressed it so hard that it had to be
reinforced by the second division. The fighting became fierce and
hand-to-hand. Sir Anseau de Brie unhorsed the commander, the Count de
Menope, and the Cypriot infantry closed in to kill. According to the
account of Philip de Novare, no less than seventeen Sicilian knights
dismounted to protect him and help him remount — only to be slaughtered
by the Cypriot sergeants shouting “Kill! Kill!” Not exactly the picture
of chivalry.
 |
| The image is from the Hundred Years War -- another in which infantry would often prove decisive. |
Yet
the battle was far from won. Filangieri’s main force was still safe
within the pass. Had they reinforced at this point, the Cypriot army
would probably have been overwhelmed. Instead, Sir Balian, with only
five knights, attacked from a point high up the slope along a rugged and
steep path leading to the head of the pass, cutting off reinforcements
at this choke point. He was so hard-pressed that the men around Beirut
urged him to go to his son’s assistance, but Beirut insisted that his
division — with the King — must continue to advance, presumably toward
St. Hilarion. Without further assistance, Sir Balian’s small troops held
the foot of the pass and prevented Filangieri from reinforcing his
advance divisions.
Below
the pass, the Cypriot/Ibelin army decimated the Imperial troops that
had engaged them. No less than sixty knights — a huge number by 13th century
standards — had been killed and forty more had been taken prisoner.
Filangieri decided to cut his losses and disengaged, retreating up the
pass and down again to Kyrenia. King Henry and the Ibelins proceeded to
the successful relief of St. Hilarion.
 |
| Castle of St. Hilarion |
Although
the Imperial army had sustained shockingly high losses by the standards
of the day, it was by no means annihilated. Yet, apparently the fight
had gone out it. The Count of Manupello’s division, denied refuge by the
Templars, surrendered, while Filangieri and the Cypriot traitors
retreated to the fortress of Kyrenia. From here they sent appeals for
help to Armenia, Antioch, and the Emperor himself, but when these
yielded nothing, Filangieri and the traitors sailed away. The garrison
they left behind eventually capitulated after a year-long siege. In
short, Agridi had proved decisive. Frederick II never again attempted to
send “orders” to King Henry, and the Pope later absolved King Henry of
all oaths to the Holy Roman Emperor.
(Note:
much of the text of this essay first appeared in Medieval Warfare
magazine. For the full article see:
https://www.karwansaraypublishers.com/medieval-warfare)
These events are depicted in detail in Dr. Schrader's:
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