In
1229, the rapaciousness of the Emperor Frederick II's baillies provoked a response they apparently had been not anticipated. In less than three
months, they were facing not resistance or insurgency but a full-scale
challenge to their authority in the shape of an invasion. Whereas, with
their mercenaries, they had held a monopoly on force of arms up to this
point, in early July 1229 they were confronted by an army led by two
barons with hundreds of knights.
In
the most comprehensive modern history of the Kingdom of Cyprus, Prof.
Peter Edbury writes that “spurred on by the news of the sequestration of
their fiefs and plight of their womenfolk,”[i]
a force of men raised by the Lord of Beirut set sail from Acre and
landed at the Templar fort of Gastria to the north of Famagusta. The
size of that force is unrecorded, but it must have included several
hundred knights. The Five Ballies Frederich II had left in control of
Cyprus (See: The Emperor’s Men) controlled not only the feudal resources
of the Kingdom of Cyprus, of which they were the effective regents,
they had also been supplied with a large force of mercenaries by Emperor
Frederick. Although the exact size of this force is likewise
unrecorded, all sources agree that it heavily outnumbered the men
brought to Cyprus by the Lord of Beirut and his brother-in-law the Lord
of Caesarea.
The
Ibelins chose to land at a Templar port, possibly in the hope of
landing unopposed. The Templars were at this point bitter enemies of
Emperor Frederick, who had tried to seize from them their castle at
Athlit and then laid siege to their headquarters at Acre. While the
Templars had effectively repelled both of these attacks, the Emperor had
the last laugh by confiscating their properties across the Holy Roman
Empire and in his Kingdom of Sicily as soon as he arrived back in the
West. Meanwhile, however, the Templars chose to remain scrupulously
neutral in the secular conflict on Cyprus.
According to Novare, “the five baillies strongly resisted the capture of the port; nonetheless, it was taken by force.”[ii]
Given the fact that the return of the Ibelins was hardly expected, it
seems unlikely that all five baillies got down to Gastria to defend the
port. More probable is simply that they had mercenaries stationed at all
the ports of the kingdom, and these forces, representing the five
baillies put up a fight but were overwhelmed.
The
Imperial forces (whoever they were) withdrew from the coast all the way
to the capital of the kingdom, Nicosia, and King Henry was sent under
guard to the most luxurious yet still unassailable mountain fortresses
of St. Hilarion. Meanwhile, the Lord of Beirut advanced “warily” toward
Nicosia, sending “friendly words to the king and even the five baillies,
saying that they came from the service to God, that they desired to
return to their homes and their fiefs, and that they were prepared both
to do right and to exact their rights.”[iii] The baillies, according to Novare, “never deigned to answer.”[iv]
Instead,
they called up the feudal army including the commons. This included all
the tenants-in-chief of the king, their rear-vassals and knights, the
turcopoles or light cavalry supplied by the local elites, and the
foot-soldiers and archers of the commons. They also pulled together the
mercenaries left behind by Frederick II, who Novare identifies as
German, Flemish, and Langobard (south Italian), in short forces from the
Holy Roman Empire. They were presumably cross-bowmen for the most part,
as that was the preferred weapon of mercenaries in this era. They may
also have engaged local mercenaries. Their total force would have
numbered in the thousands, with several hundred knights.
When
the Ibelin force approached Nicosia, the five baillies took their army
and marched out to meet them on the outskirts of the city. Despite
efforts by the clergy to broker a reconciliation between the parties,
there was really no readiness for compromise nor interest in peace by
the point. The baillies had taken oaths to prevent the Ibelins from
returning and knew that the Emperor would not look favorably upon them
if they failed to expel Beirut. Since they held their positions at the
Emperor’s pleasure, they really had no choice but to attempt to defeat
Beirut so soundly that he never dare return.
Indeed,
the sources claim that the baillies took the precaution of detailing 25
of their best knights with the task of killing Beirut. This was hardly
chivalrous, to say the least, but the reasoning was undoubtedly that the
elimination of Beirut would end their troubles. Whether they also
tasked knights to kill his brother-in-law the former Constable of Cyprus
is not recorded, but in light of the outcome, this is not impossible.
It
was Saturday, July 14, 1229. The two armies drew up across a plowed
field. “The captains of the squadrons surveyed each other and
reconnoitered on the one hand and on the other; each placed himself
opposite to him whom he most hated…”[v]
When the sides clashed, it was (as in all civil wars) with a fury and
passion unknown between strangers. Soon the dust of the field had been
churned up by the hundreds of hooves and was blown about by a strong
west wind. Vision was severely impaired.
Beirut
soon found himself cut off from his sons and squires. He was confronted
by an attacker without a visor and with a sword-thrust to his mouth cut
his head in two, but the collision of the horses forced his own horse
into a ditch. Unhorsed, he found himself surrounded by some fifteen
enemy knights and none of his own. Fortunately, he had an unnamed number
of loyal “sergeants” with him. They took refuge together in the called
enclosure of a church and here defended themselves against the attempts
of the fifteen imperial knights to break in and slay them. His situation
was apparently desperate, when Sir Anseau de Brie, a loyal supporter of
the Ibelins, rode to the rescue, taking on all fifteen knights so
vigorously that he broke his lance, his sword, and even his dagger.
Novare records that “he received so many blows that he could hardly use
his hands.”[vi]
Meanwhile,
the Lord of Beirut's’ eldest son and heir, a young man only about
22-years-old at this time, had succeeded in setting a portion of the
enemy army under Sir Hugh de Gibelet to flight. Having
chased them off the field, he turned back and re-entered the fray with
his still large and intact contingent of knights. This charge appears to
have been decisive. Novara describes it like this:
“…as soon as his enemies saw and recognized his standards they were afraid and fled towards the city of Nicosia. Sir Balian, who came in advance of all the others, encountered them most eagerly and struck their standard bearer so hard that he himself fell to the ground, he and his horse falling together; there were many taken and killed, but many escaped due to the fall of Sir Balian.”[vii]
When
the dust finally cleared, a bloody field revealed an exceptionally
large number of human and equine corpses. The dead included two
prominent noblemen: Walter, Lord of Caesarea and former Constable of
Cyprus, and Sir Gerard de Montaigu, who had the distinction of being the
nephew of both the Master of both the Temple and the Hospital, as well
as a nephew of the Archbishop of Nicosia. It was not recorded how
Caesarea died, but Montaigu was pinned beneath his horse and evidently
crushed.
The
dead did not include any of the baillies. All had managed to escape the
field. Sir Gauvain de Cheneché took refuge in Kantara, Sir Hugh de
Gibelet and the two Amaurys (Barlais and Bethsan) all made it to St.
Hilarion where they held the king captive. Sir William Rivet appears to
have made it to the port of Kyrenia and from there to have taken ship
for Armenia to try to get word to and help from the Emperor. He failed
in both as he died in Armenia, possibly of wounds incurred at the
battle.
The
Ibelins had won a great victory and in so doing had re-established
themselves on Cyprus, rewarded their followers with the return of their
fiefs, and also rescued the women and children who had been frightened
into seeking sanctuary with the Knights of Saint John. But they had by
no means won the war. Their first task was to drive the four remaining
baillies out of their impregnable fortresses — and free King Henry of
Cyprus.
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Dr. Helena P. Schrader holds a PhD in History.
She is the Chief Editor of the Real Crusades History Blog.
She
is an award-winning novelist and author of numerous books both fiction
and non-fiction. Her three-part biography of Balian d'Ibelin won a total
of 14 literary accolades. Her most recent release is a novel about the
founding of the crusader Kingdom of Cyprus. You can find out more at: http://crusaderkingdoms.com
[i] Edbury, Peter. The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374. Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 60.
[ii] Novare, Philip. The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus. Columbia University Press, 1936, p. 100.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] Ibid, p. 102.
[vii] Ibid.
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