+Real Crusades History+ is dedicated to
remembering the real contribution of the Knights Templar to the history
of the crusades.
Dr. Schrader continues
our fifteen-part series on the Knights Templar with the seventh of our
"Ten True Tales of the Knights Templar." Today's essay looks at the
role of the Knights Templar on Cyprus 1191-1192.
The Cypriot Coast seen from the Byzantine Castle of Kantara |
In the summer of 1191 Richard I of England, cognizant of his inability
to govern Cyprus, made the strategic decision to sell the island to the Knights
Templar. It was a wise decision because he was fully engaged in a struggle to
regain the Holy Land itself and also had a vast empire back in Europe that
would inevitably require his attention sooner or later. By selling Cyprus to
the Knights Templar for 100,000 gold bezants, Richard not only replenished his
war-chest to ensure adequate resources for the task at hand (the war against
Saladin for the Holy Land), he also ensured that the strategically critical
island of Cyprus was in the hands of Christians fanatically devoted to the
cause of securing and defending Christian control of Holy Land in the long run.
It seemed like a perfect solution.
Professor Malcolm Barber in one of the best books on the Knights
Templar ever written (The New Knighthood:
A History of the Order of the Temple, Cambridge University Press, 1994),
notes that this was an opportunity for the Order to “establish their own
independent state,” something later achieved by the Teutonic Knights in Prussia
and the Hospitallers on Rhodes/Malta. It goes without saying, that had the
Knights Templar controlled Cyprus from this date onward, they would have
concentrated their treasure and forces there and so have been better positioned
to withstand Philip IV’s attack on them in 1307. Cyprus is an island encompassing
nearly 10,000 square kilometers of mostly fertile land including extensive
forests. It has ample water resources, significant mineral deposits, notably
copper, and a mild Mediterranean climate. It is located 65 km south of modern
Turkey and 95 kilometers from the Syrian coast. Given its wealth and location,
it the Templars had established themselves here in a sustainable manner the
Order might still exist today.
However, far from establishing a strong, independent state, the Knights
Templar returned the island to Richard of England less than a year after they
had purchased it. Barber explains their failure with the fact that “the project
proved too ambitious,” (p. 119) while another historian of the Templars, John
Robinson (Dungeon, Fire and Sword: The
Knights Templar in the Crusades, Michael O’Mara Books, 1991) noted that the
Templars “totally committed to an active military campaign [on the mainland],
could spare only a few men….” (p. 187). All sources agree based on common
primary sources that the Templars committed only 14 knights, while George
Hill (A History of Cyprus, Volume 2: The
Frankish Period 1192 – 1432, Cambridge University Press, 1948) adds that the
knights were supported by 29 sergeants and 74 infantry. But the Templars didn’t
just give up; they were driven from the island by a rebellion.
Given the fact that Richard of England had taken the island so rapidly
in May 1191 (see Conquest of Cyprus I and II) largely because of widespread
support from the population, an uprising against Templar rule was anything but
inevitable. Although he’d expropriated for himself half the
royal revenues of the island, along with all the personal treasure taken from the
self-styled “Emperor” Isaac Comnenus, who was widely viewed as a “tyrant” if
not also an “usurper,” his regime was not viewed as “oppressive” ― at least not
in the very brief period he spent on the island. This may have been because he
had promised a restoration of the laws as they had been under the Byzantine
Emperor Manuel I Comnenus.
It is possible that after the euphoria of defeating “the tyrant” had
worn off, the inhabitants of Cyprus began to resent foreign domination. The
population was overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox by faith, and had been part of the
Byzantine Empire for since 330 AD, with only sporadic periods of Muslim rule. An
indication of possible popular disaffection is the fact that, at least
according Hill, there was one uprising against Richard’s administration by a
Greek monk, related to the deposed tyrant.
However, it appears that Richard’s men (and only two knights are ever
listed as being left on the island by him, Richard de Camville and Robert de
Thornham) were able to put this rebellion down very easily, hanging the pretender,
without any losses or apparent bloodshed. This rather suggests that the
pretender had virtually no support. This is hardly surprising when we consider
that Richard’s Richard’s two knightly administrators would hardly have been in a
position to institute any widespread changes in the laws and taxes of the
island, but rather had been tasked to restore
the laws of widely respected Manuel I. Since
Camville and Thornham could hardly have known what these Byzantine laws entailed,
they would have been compelled to depend upon the existing bureaucracy to
collect traditional taxes owed the monarch. In short, from the point of view of
the population of Cyprus, Richard the Lionheart’s rule was a restoration to the
period of good governance that had preceded the usurpation of power by the tyrant Isaac
Comnenus and there was truly little to rebel against.
Cyriot Coast - "The Birthplace of Aphrodite" - on a calm day. |
That was not the case under the Templars. On the contrary, when rebellion
broke out on April 5, 1192 it was apparently supported by such a large number
of people that the most effective fighting force in the Holy Land, famous for
their discipline in attack and retreat and for overwhelming the best
professional soldiers of Islam, took refuge from the angry mob in their
commandery in the city of Nicosia. Furthermore, an offer to surrender the
entire island in exchange for a safe-conduct to the coast, was rejected by the mob. This strongly indicates that the
Templars were not just unwelcome ― they were hated.
Clearly something had changed. So what exactly had they done?
Barber suggests the Templars “alienat[ed] the population with their
heavy taxation and arbitrary rule.” (p.119). Robinson is more colorful (as
usual) saying: “Their arrogance in taking whatever they wanted, and their
insulting treatment of the local barons and people, had generated increasing animosity….”
(p. 191.) Hill argues that the Templars imposed fresh dues on the markets, in
addition to the existing taxes, in order to pay the balance of the 100,000
bezants still owed to Richard of England. But people have a tendency to find ways
to evade taxes, especially when the tax-collectors are in cahoots with the taxpayers
as would have been the case here, given the small size of the Templar garrison
and the continued need to rely on the existing bureaucracy.
Turning to one of the most credible primary sources, one based in part
on the contemporary chronicle by a resident in Outremer, The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, (Peter Edbury’s
translation published by Ashgate as The
Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade), we find a far more graphic
and compelling reason for a revolt. Namely: “[The Templars] thought they could
govern the people of the island in the same way they treated the rural
population in the land of Jerusalem. They thought they could ill-treat, beat
and misuse them….” In short, the Templars attempted to impose new taxes not
traditional to the period of Manuel I (and so representing a breach of Richard’s
promise), and more important treated the Greek Orthodox population (and one
suspects their priests) as if they were Muslim peasants.
What happened next has unfortunately become very distorted in some
modern accounts. While sober accounts like that of Barber refer only to a “desperate
charge” to free the Templars trapped in Nicosia, Robinson adds that they
engaged in a “fierce attack on the local population.” Hill, an otherwise
serious historian, indulges in a dramatic account, claiming:
On Easter Sunday morning, therefore, having heard mass, they sallied
forth, completely surprising the Greeks, who had never suspected so small a
force of so audacious an enterprise. The Latins slew the Greeks
indiscriminately like sheep; the mounted Templars rode through the town
spitting on their lances everyone they could reach; the streets ran with blood….The
Templars rode through the land, sacking the villages and spreading desolation,
for the population of both cities and villages fled to the mountains. (Hill, p.
37)
Really? With 14 knights and 29 sergeants? Against a population that
had successfully hemmed them into their commandery in the first place? And
then, despite this complete and utter victory they gave the island up? Obviously
not. This is sheer hyperbole, and significantly Hill does not provide a single
source for his dramatic and exaggerated account. It appears more a device to
set up the island as ripe for the arrival of Guy de Lusignan.
Turning instead to The French
Continuation of William of Tyre we find an account that without
whitewashing or minimizing the violence of the Templars nevertheless keeps
things in perspective. Namely:
When Brother Reynald Bochard who was their commander and the brothers
realized that the Greeks would have no mercy, they commended themselves to God
and were confessed and absolved. Then they armed themselves and went out
against the Greeks and fought them. God by His providence gave the victory to
the Templars, and many Greeks were killed or taken. They immediately came to
Acre and explained what had happened to the master and convent. They took
counsel among themselves and agreed that they could no longer island as their
property, but…would return it to King Richard in exchange for the security that
they had given him. (Edbury, p. 112)
This account makes clear that the Templar sortie was a hard-fought
battle (not a slaughter of “sheep”), and while the Templars managed to cut
their way out at considerable cost to the Greeks, they headed straight for the
coast to take ship for Acre and wash their hands of the entire island! The Templars
did not leave behind a “desolated” and depopulated island, with the inhabitants
cowering in the mountains. They left behind an island in the hands of the local
elites. This is a very significant point and one to keep in mind when examining
the establishment of Frankish rule on Cyprus under the Lusignans.
The greatest tragedy of this short episode in the history of the Knights Templar is that it denied them a kingdom of their own. Had they handled the situation in Cyprus better, the Knights Templar would not have been vulnerable to King Philip IV's machinations a century later. Although Templars might have been arrested and properties confiscated in France, the Order itself would have survived -- just as the Hospitallers did from their independent bases of Rhodes and then Malta.
Sources:
Barber, Malcolm. The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple.University of Cambridge Press, 1994.
Edbury, Peter. Crusades Texts in Translation: The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade. Ashgate, 1998.
Hill, George. A History of Cyprus: Volume 2: The Frankish Period 1192-1432. Cambridge University Press. 1948.
Robinson, John J.. Dungeon, Fire and Sword: The Knights Templar in the Crusades. Michael O'Mara Books, 1994.
The facts depicted here are the basis for the novel "The Last Crusader Kingdom"
Dr Helena P. Schrader holds a PhD in History.
She is the Chief Editor of the Real Crusades History Blog.
She
is the author of numerous books both fiction and non-fiction, including
a three-part biography of Balian d'Ibelin and a novel about the
founding of the crusader Kingdom of Cyprus. You can find out more at:
http://crusaderkingdoms.com
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