It is widely believed that between the Battle of Hattin and the Third Crusade there was no military action in the Holy Land. This is not entirely true as Saladin, of course, captured virtually all the cities of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and a number of key castles as well. More surprising, however, is that the Franks also undertook an astonishing offensive more than two years before the arrival of the main crusading forces under the Kings of France and England. Dr. Schrader tells us about it:
In early June
1189, the survivors of the catastrophe at Hattin — with the architect of that
disaster conspicuously absent — took to the field in an offensive operation to
re-take the lost Christian territory of Sidon. The German crusade under
Friedrich Barbarossa had just set out, but was more than a year away from
reaching the Holy Land — even if all had gone well. Henry II of England was
fighting with Philip II of France (and his son Richard), and neither king was preparing
for a crusade at all. Guy de Lusignan was in Antioch after swearing an oath
never to take up arms against the Saracens again. Saladin, on the other hand,
was not only in complete control of all the cities of the former Kingdom of
Jerusalem except Tyre, he had recently taken the defiant Christian castles of Safed,
Belvoir, Montreal and Kerak. Taking the offensive at this time was therefore a
remarkable demonstration of defiance and spirit on the part of the men
concentrated in Tyre.
Unfortunately,
we know very little about this operation. The leadership is unnamed in
surviving sources, but was almost certainly Reginald de Sidon and Balian d’Ibelin.
Both barons had fought their way off the field at Hattin and been engaged in
military operations since: Sidon in a futile attempt to defend his inland
castle of Belfort (sometimes called Beaufort), and Ibelin at Jerusalem. Not
only were both barons in Tyre at this time, but both had an interest in
recapturing the important coastal city of Sidon. The Lord of Sidon obviously
wanted his barony back, while Ibelin had betrothed his eldest daughter to
Sidon, so that he too had a vested interest in the return of Sidon to his furture
son-in-law’s control. While it is possible that Conrad de Montferrat also took
part in the expedition, there is no mention of this, and he had little reason
to undertake an adventure of this sort. A bird in the hand, as the saying goes,
is worth two in the bush and Tyre was his; to take part in the expedition was
to risk losing his grip on Tyre (or his life) for an objective that would fall
to another, namely the Lord of Sidon.
As for the
troops involved, although individual crusaders were starting to trickle into
Tyre, no large contingents had yet arrived.
Therefore, the men who set out to re-take Sidon on June 3, 1189 were
predominantly men from Outremer, mostly survivors of Hattin. The
bulk of these men would have been the Turcopoles and sergeants that broke out
of the encirclement at Hattin with Sidon and Ibelin. They would have been cooped
up in Tyre almost two years, and would have survived two sieges from Saladin
since. The remainder would have been the remnants of the garrisons of other
Christian cities, who had been given a safe-conduct to Tyre in exchange for
surrendering the cities they had been left to guard. Most of these men would
have left families behind in the now-lost cities, towns and villages of the
Kingdom of Jerusalem. Most would have had no knowledge of what had become of
their wives and children. These were men who had already lost everything, but were not prepared to crawl away in despair; they wanted to fight back.
While Sidon and
Ibelin’s personal interest in Sidon may have inspired them to action, the
operation was far from a personal or selfish one. It had the clear strategic
goal of extending Frankish control in the direction of the remaining remnants
of the other two crusader states: the County of Tripoli and the Principality of
Antioch. The capture of Sidon would have been a first step toward the
re-capture of Beirut, and the re-establishment of contiguous Frankish control of
the coastline of the northern Levant. In addition, the territory between Tyre
and Sidon is very fertile and firm Frankish control of the cities at both ends
would have enabled cultivation of the coastal plane, something vitally important
to support the population of Tyre, which was flooded with refuges from the rest
of the kingdom.
Last but not
least, Sidon had been a major ship-building port for centuries. The survivors of Hattin were more dependent
on communication and trade with the Western world than ever before. Having a
native ship-building industry would have been an important asset.
In short, the
assault on Sidon makes more strategic sense than the siege of Acre which Guy de
Lusignan started a few months later. To
be sure, Acre was the larger, better and more prosperous port. Lusignan may
have been motivated by the desire to reward his followers with various
monopolies and “money fiefs” after taking Acre. Yet re-establishing solid lines
of communication and supply to Tripoli and Antioch is a much more compelling
military argument for the assault on Sidon. Notably, Richard the Lionheart
planned a similar attempt after it became clear that Jerusalem and Cairo were beyond
his grasp.
Due to the paucity
of sources, we know almost nothing about the course of the campaign beyond the
fact that ten days later the Frankish forces were back in Tyre having been
forced to withdraw. That is notably not the same thing as being routed or
chased back to Tyre with their tails between their legs. There is no indication
of significant casualties; certainly Sidon and Ibelin were healthy and hearty
on their return based on their continued activities. All of this sounds
suspiciously as if the Franks did not engage in a battle at all, but rather
prudently withdrew when confronted with overwhelming (or at any rate insurmountable)
opposition.
Because of the
lack of either success or spectacular failure, the incident has been all but
forgotten. Yet it deserves remembering because it is poignant evidence of the
fighting spirit of the men of Outremer.
Later crusaders were all too ready to report about their own courageous
feats at arms, belittling the prowess, courage and, indeed, manliness, of the
natives of Outremer. The legend arouse of the weak, effeminate, decadent “poulains”
(Franks born in the crusader states) and the heroic crusaders. It is a legend
we should not to perpetuate, as the evidence points to the opposite: the “poulains”
were fierce and canny fighting men, more than ready and willing to fight for
their homeland. They simply tempered that valor with discretion learned from
being perpetually outnumbered by their foes.
Dr Helena P. Schrader holds a PhD in History.
She is the Chief Editor of the Real Crusades History Blog.
She is the author of numerous books both fiction and non-fiction, including a three-part biography of Balian d'Ibelin.
Today we call it a "tactical retreat" . . . because a suicidal charge is sheer stupidity.
ReplyDelete